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The Resilience of Métis Title: Rejecting
Assumptions of Extinguishment
KAREN DRAKE AND ADAM GAUDRY

For many years, the Crown disputed Métis title claims by contending that
any previously existing Métis rights, including title, had been extinguished.1
We argue, however, that this is not the case in at least some areas of the
Métis homeland.2 In this chapter, we review the three means by which
Aboriginal rights can be extinguished in Canadian law: by surrender, by
legislation prior to 17 April 1982, and by constitutional amendment.3 Tis
chapter builds on our previous work,4 in which we argue that historical
Métis land use patterns can satisfy the test for Aboriginal title. Te relevant
case law here is Tsilhqot'in Nation v British Columbia, a Supreme Court of
Canada decision from 2014.5 Once the Métis show that their occupation of
their traditional homeland is sufcient, continuous, and exclusive, the next
step is to demonstrate that their title to land has not been extinguished.
Focusing on Manitoba, we take this step, and thus further strengthen the
argument in support of Métis title.
We do not endorse the jurisprudence pertaining to, or the existence of,
the doctrine of extinguishment. Both have been thoroughly and deftly critiqued elsewhere.6 Our goal is to supplement this critique by highlighting
the historical and legal reasons for questioning the applicability of this doctrine to Métis title claims.
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Three Means of Extinguishment
Extinguishment by Legislation
In Canadian law, Aboriginal rights, including title, could be extinguished
unilaterally by competent legislation prior to 17 April 1982, when section
35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982,7 came into efect. After that point, legislation could no longer extinguish Aboriginal rights and title.8 Terefore,
Aboriginal rights can now be extinguished only by surrender or by constitutional amendment,9 both of which are discussed below. Here, we examine
whether Métis rights have been extinguished by legislation.
Te Supreme Court of Canada in R v Sparrow established the current
test for the extinguishment of Aboriginal rights by legislation: legislation
must exhibit a clear and plain intention to extinguish the right at issue.10
Te onus of meeting this test is on the party claiming that the right has been
extinguished.11 In articulating the test, the court afrmed the standard for
extinguishment expressed by Justice Hall in Calder v Attorney-General of
British Columbia.12 It rejected the standard expressed by Justice Judson
in Calder, which was that legislation that is merely inconsistent with the
continued existence of an Aboriginal right is sufcient to extinguish the
right.13 Elsewhere in his decision in Calder, Hall J explained that because
Aboriginal rights are legal rights, they can be extinguished only by surrender or by competent legislation, and that the legislation must be specifc.14
Tis is a high threshold.15 Courts have rarely concluded that legislation
met the “clear and plain intention” test and was thus efective in extinguishing Aboriginal rights or title.16
For the purpose of efecting an extinguishment, competent legislation
means either federal or Imperial legislation.17 With respect to federal legislation, a majority of the Supreme Court of Canada established in Delgamuukw
that the government has “the exclusive power to extinguish aboriginal rights,
including aboriginal title.”18 Te court cited section 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867, which provides that the federal government has legislative
jurisdiction over “Indians, and Lands reserved for the Indians.”19 Tis principle applies equally to Métis title, given the Supreme Court of Canada’s
decision in Daniels v Canada (Indian Afairs and Northern Development),
according to which Métis are “Indians” for the purposes of section 91(24)
and thus within the legislative jurisdiction of the federal government.20 With
respect to Imperial legislation, a majority of the court held in R v Sappier;
R v Gray that “during the colonial period, the power to extinguish aboriginal
rights rested with the Imperial Crown.”21
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Te evisceration of the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity as applied
to Aboriginal rights in Tsilhqot'in does not alter the requirement that legislation be federal in order to extinguish Aboriginal rights. It is true that
Tsilhqot'in stands for the proposition that Aboriginal rights, including title,
no longer lie within the core of Ottawa’s jurisdiction pursuant to section
91(24).22 However, this proposition pertains to the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity, which provided only one of two independent rationales for
the federal legislation requirement in Delgamuukw.23 Te other rationale
rests on a pith and substance analysis, which is unafected by Tsilhqot'in’s
removal of Aboriginal rights from the core of section 91(24). Te majority
in Delgamuukw explained that although provincial laws of general application can apply to section 91(24) Indians and Indian land proprio vigore
(of their own force), a provincial law of general application could not apply
proprio vigore so as to extinguish Aboriginal rights.24 To meet the test for
extinguishment discussed above, the provincial law, of necessity, would not
be a law of general application. Tat is, any provincial law that meets the
high threshold of Sparrow’s clear and plain intention test would thereby be
in relation to Indians and Indian lands under section 91(24) and would thus
be ultra vires.25 In other words, the pith and substance of the provincial legislation would be in relation to section 91(24), even though the legislation
would not touch on the core of the section after Tsilhqot'in.
As a result, when assessing the possible extinguishment of Métis rights,
absent a delegation of authority by the Imperial Parliament,26 we can exclude
provincial and colonial legislation from the analysis. From the Métis perspective, this is one of the victories of Daniels, which was overlooked by
those who questioned the value of a mere declaration that the Métis are
“Indians” under section 91(24).27
An exhaustive examination of all federal and Imperial legislation from
the late eighteenth century to 1982 is beyond the scope of this chapter.
Nevertheless, the only potentially relevant statutes of which we are aware
are the Manitoba Act, 1870, and the Dominion Lands Act.28 Te former
sets out a process by which the Indian title of the Métis in the original
postage-stamp-sized province of Manitoba would be extinguished, and the
latter does the same for the Métis in the northwest but outside the original
province. Section 31 of the Manitoba Act states,
And whereas, it is expedient, towards the extinguishment of the Indian
Title to the lands in the Province, to appropriate a portion of such ungranted
lands, to the extent of one million four hundred thousand acres thereof, for
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the beneft of the families of the half-breed residents, it is hereby enacted,
that, under regulations to be from time to time made by the Governor General in Council, the Lieutenant-Governor shall select such lots or tracts in
such parts of the Province as he may deem expedient, to the extent aforesaid, and divide the same among the children of the half-breed heads of
families residing in the Province at the time of the said transfer to Canada,
and the same shall be granted to the said children respectively, in such
mode and on such conditions as to settlement and otherwise, as the Governor General in Council may from time to time determine.29

Section 125(e) of the Dominion Lands Act, as amended in 1879, states,
Te following powers are hereby delegated to the Governor in Council:
...
To satisfy any claims existing in connection with the extinguishment of
the Indian title preferred by half-breeds resident in the North-West Territories outside the limits of Manitoba, on the ffteenth day of July, one thousand eight hundred and seventy, by granting lands to such persons, to such
extent and on such terms and conditions, as may be expedient.30

Given the constitutional status of the Manitoba Act, 1870,31 section 31
prima facie falls within the category of constitutional amendments, which
are discussed below. Te test for extinguishment by means of legislation and
for extinguishment by means of constitutional amendment, though, is one
and the same.32
At frst glance, both provisions might appear to satisfy Sparrow’s clear
and plain intention test; they explicitly state that their purpose is to extinguish the Indian title of the Métis. Tey might seem not only to meet but
to exceed the threshold for extinguishment, according to which the legislature’s intention must be clear and plain but need not be express.33 As
Paul Jofe and Mary Ellen Turpel rightly recognize, though, these provisions contemplate, but do not actually legislate, an extinguishment of
Métis title.34 In other words, the intention exhibited in these provisions
is not to extinguish Métis title directly, but rather to allow for an extinguishment on the occurrence of certain future events. More specifcally,
section 31 of the Manitoba Act, 1870, outlines a process for distributing
1.4 million acres to the children of Métis heads of families, the purpose of
which was to extinguish Métis title. Similarly, section 12(e) of the Dominion Lands Act gives the governor-in-council the power to extinguish Métis

Copyright material, not for distribution

This PDF for the use in the The Osgoode Digital Commons only

Te Resilience of Métis Title

75

title by granting land.35 Te ofce of the superintendent general of Indian
afairs seems to have recognized the accuracy of this interpretation when
it issued a report in 1906 stating that the Aboriginal title of the “Indians
and half-breeds” in a certain portion of Saskatchewan and Alberta had not
yet been extinguished; the report recommended making a treaty with the
Indians and settling the claims of the Half-breeds.36 If section 12(e) had
already extinguished the Aboriginal rights of the Métis, the 1906 report
would have been redundant and therefore unnecessary with respect to the
Métis. Tus, sections 31 and 12(e), in and of themselves, do not satisfy
the clear and plain intention test, as they only allude to another means for
future extinguishment. Te analysis, then, requires an examination of the
events and actions undertaken to implement these provisions. Te issuance of scrip was a method of implementing both section 31 and section
12(e).37 Scrip was a certifcate that entitled the holder “to receive payment
later in the form of cash, goods or land.”38
Sections 31 and 12(e), as well as the issuance of scrip, have been the subject of various instances of litigation, none of which is determinative of the
issue of the extinguishment of Métis title. In Manitoba Metis Federation
Inc. v Canada (Attorney General), the trial judge concluded, and the Court
of Appeal agreed, that the purpose of section 31 was not to extinguish the
Indian title of the Métis.39 At frst glance, this appears to be a victory for the
Métis. Tis conclusion, however, was the position advanced by the Crown
in attempting to counter the Métis claimants’ argument that the language
of section 31 constituted an admission that the Métis of the Red River in
1870 held Indian title.40 Te trial judge and the Court of Appeal rejected the
position of the claimants and held that the language of extinguishment in
the section was used as a matter of political expediency, “to make palatable
to the Opposition the grant of land and thereby ensure passage of the Act.”41
At the same time, the Court of Appeal made the incongruous statement that
the ability of the Métis of the Red River “to claim Aboriginal title was lost
(or at least seriously impeded) through” the enactment of the section.42 Tis
statement is not determinative of the signifcance of the section, as it is not
based on an application of Sparrow’s clear and plain intention test. In fact,
no level of court in Manitoba Metis Federation applied the Sparrow test to
section 31. It was not necessary to do so, because the claim advanced in
Manitoba Metis Federation was for breach of fduciary duty, not for Aboriginal title.43
In R v Morin and Daigneault, a judge of the Saskatchewan Provincial
Court held that the scrip issued to the Métis for the sake of implementing
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a later version of section 12(e) of the Dominion Lands Act was not efective in extinguishing the Métis claimants’ Aboriginal right to fsh.44 Te
Dominion Lands Act makes no mention of fshing rights and thus did not
meet the clear and plain intention test for extinguishing them.45 Te question whether scrip extinguished the Aboriginal title of the Métis claimants,
however, was not before the court.46 Tis question is at issue in Morin v
Canada.47 According to Jean Teillet, this is the only claim to date seeking a
declaration that the Métis have Aboriginal title.48 Teillet reports, however,
that the proceedings in this case are currently stayed.49
We argue below that the nature of the events and actions surrounding
sections 31 and 12(e) is such that the analysis that best upholds the honour
of the Crown and facilitates reconciliation is one viewed through the lens of
a potential surrender, rather than extinguishment by legislation or constitutional amendment.
Extinguishment by Surrender
Just as the federal government has jurisdiction to extinguish Aboriginal
rights, so too does it have jurisdiction to accept a surrender of Aboriginal rights,50 which undoubtedly includes Métis rights after the Supreme
Court of Canada’s decision in Daniels. Thus, any supposed surrender
made solely to a provincial government can be excluded from the
analysis.
Historical Treaties
History provides little evidence of extinguishment of Métis rights through
surrender by treaty. Although individuals of mixed ancestry were occasionally admitted into treaty, Métis collectives in Canada did not generally execute historical land surrender treaties, with only one possible exception,
discussed below. Tose Métis who entered into a treaty on an individual
basis did not thereby extinguish the Aboriginal rights of their descendants.51
As the Supreme Court of Canada in R v Powley explains, extinguishment
depends, at least in part, on whether the Métis community collectively
adhered to a treaty.52 Te federal government attempted to avoid treaty
making with Métis collectives whenever possible, preferring instead to deal
with the Métis as individuals by issuing scrip to them pursuant to the
Dominion Lands Act. Te one exception is the 1875 Half-breed adhesion to
Treaty 3, which was signed by the “Half-breeds” at Rainy River and Rainy
Lake in northwestern Ontario.53 Te claim that the “Half-breeds” who
signed the adhesion constituted a “Métis” community is contested.54 If the
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community were Métis, the question arises as to whether the adhesion
extinguished its rights and title.
Te federal and provincial governments take the position that the numbered treaties, given their written text, efected an extinguishment by surrender of Aboriginal rights, including title, and replaced those rights with
the hunting, fshing, and other rights set out in the treaties.55 Decisions
of the Supreme Court of Canada thus far have been consistent with this
interpretation, including with respect to Treaty 3.56 Indigenous peoples, in
contrast, have long disputed the Crown’s interpretation.57 Both the Royal
Commission on Aboriginal Peoples and the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission explain that Indigenous peoples understood and still understand treaties as agreements to share the land on a nation-to-nation basis,
not as “extinguishments” or “surrenders” of “rights.”58 Tis interpretation
is based on oral agreements and Indigenous legal institutions such as the
exchange of wampum belts.59 It is supported not only by Indigenous traditions, but also by the research of non-Indigenous scholars.60 Regardless of
the Supreme Court of Canada’s decisions applying the Crown’s interpretation, this issue is far from settled.61 It engages the question of whether
land is a part of our community with which we are in a relationship and to
which we owe responsibilities, or a form of property over which we exercise
rights. In other words, this issue goes to the heart of the diference between
Indigenous constitutional and legal orders, on the one hand, and Western
constitutional and legal orders, on the other.62 Tis is the very issue that
must be addressed if reconciliation is to be possible. Not surprisingly, the
Truth and Reconciliation Commission, in its fnal report, devoted considerable attention to Indigenous understandings of the treaties and also called
on the federal government, on behalf of all Canadians, to renew or establish
treaty relationships in accordance with the principles of mutual recognition
and mutual respect.63 Tus, dismissing an Indigenous understanding of the
numbered treaties is not an option for those who value reconciliation.
Modern Agreements
In many instances, Canada has acted as if Métis title were adequately extinguished, which would make any modern agreements with the Métis, for the
purposes of extinguishing title, unnecessary.64 But in comprehensive land
claims processes in the Northwest Territories, the federal government has
seemed to presume that some Métis title claims are outstanding. Although
the apparent method of extinguishment through scrip was practised in both
the north and south, when the comprehensive land claims processes were
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initiated in the Northwest Territories, so too were land claims with Métis
groups, both inside and outside of Dene claims negotiations. As Larry Chartrand notes, both the Sahtu Dene and Métis Comprehensive Land
Claim Agreement and the Northwest Territory Métis Nation Agreementin-Principle presume that scrip did not sufciently extinguish Métis title so
as to leave it an ongoing burden on the Crown. Yet, the historical factors by
which Métis title was supposedly extinguished through scrip in the Northwest Territories do not difer markedly from their counterparts in the southern areas where the federal government presumes that Métis title was
extinguished by the same scrip policy via the Dominion Lands Act.65
In each of these situations, the Métis were issued scrip, while also currently rejecting the claim that scrip was sufcient to extinguish their title.
In essence, Chartrand argues that “the experience in the Northwest Territories demonstrates that the federal government is prepared to include Metis
communities as eligible for the comprehensive claims process.”66 However,
it has not extended the same treatment to Métis communities south of the
60th parallel, even though its policy toward them was the same. Chartrand
suggests that the main reason for this was jurisdictional. Te lack of provincial jurisdiction north of the 60th parallel precluded government inaction
based on denial-of-jurisdiction arguments. As Chartrand notes, the decision in Daniels that the Métis are within federal jurisdiction now precludes
those same arguments south of the 60th parallel.67 Chartrand concludes that
“there are Metis claims south of 60° to lands and resources that are arguably
no diferent in kind than those in the north and should be equally acknowledged. Consequently, the existence of Metis specifc modern treaties in the
north ofers a solid precedent for the promotion of Metis treaties in other
parts of Canada.”68 Modern agreements in the north, though proposing to
extinguish Métis title, have in fact recognized its continued existence.
Ottawa’s willingness to negotiate with the Métis in the north on issues of
land rights and title that it claims to have already extinguished through scrip
grants generations ago is evidence that it may also be having doubts about
the efcacy of the extinguishment of Métis title.
Section 31 of the Manitoba Act, 1870
Section 31 of the Manitoba Act, 1870, is quoted above on pages 73–74. In
this provision, the Canadian government recognizes the existence of Métis
“Indian title” in Rupert’s Land in 1870 for the purposes of extinguishment.
In the House of Commons on 2 May 1870, Sir John A. Macdonald stated
that these 1.4 million acres would constitute a “reservation” for “the purpose
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of extinguishing the Indian title and all claims upon the lands within the
limits of the province.”69 Sir George-Étienne Cartier also argued in the
House that, like treaties with the Indians, a large Métis land reserve was
necessary “for the purpose of extinguishing the claims of half-breeds.”70 Te
act was seen as facilitating the Métis “extinguishment of the Indian Title to
the lands in the Province,” through the appropriation of “ungranted lands, to
the extent of one million four hundred thousand acres thereof, for the beneft of the families of the halfbreed residents.”71 Te act and the statements of
Macdonald and Cartier seem to assume that there was a Métis share of
“Indian title” to extinguish.
Section 31 should be analyzed within the framework of a potential surrender, not as a potential extinguishment by constitutional amendment.
As discussed below, the section is not a unilateral constitutional provision;
rather, it refects a bilateral agreement between two parties that was reached
after extensive negotiations, which resulted in modifcations to the initial
position of each side.72 Analyzing section 31 as a surrender better refects
the agency of the parties, which in turn is more likely to uphold the honour of the Crown and to promote reconciliation.73 Te holding in Manitoba
Metis Federation that section 31 is not a treaty does not preclude conceptualizing it within the surrender framework.74 In that decision, a majority of
the Supreme Court held that the Métis plaintifs failed to establish that the
Crown owed a fduciary duty to the Métis when implementing section 31.
Nonetheless, the majority held that the section is a constitutional obligation, which engages the honour of the Crown and which the Crown failed
to implement diligently.75 According to the court, this constitutional obligation is analogous to a treaty promise, has a treaty-like history and character,
establishes solemn promises that “are no less fundamental than treaty promises,” and is the result of negotiations aimed at reconciling Métis Aboriginal rights with the Crown’s claim to sovereignty.76 Given the treaty-like and
bilateral nature of section 31, it is more appropriate to analyze it as a surrender than as a unilateral constitutional amendment.
Te Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Ontario (Attorney General) v
Bear Island Foundation establishes a contentious yet not overturned principle pertaining to extinguishment by surrender.77 In this case, the Temagami
First Nation argued that it had never signed the Robinson-Huron Treaty,
which purports to cover its traditional territory, and hence its Aboriginal
rights remained unextinguished. Te court rejected this argument and held
that regardless of whether any representative of the Temagami First Nation
actually signed the Robinson-Huron Treaty in 1850, the Aboriginal rights of
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the nation were surrendered when it subsequently received treaty payments
and was assigned a reserve.78 In other words, if an Aboriginal nation receives
the benefts of a surrender, it is held to the burden of the surrender. We contend that the inverse of this proposition should also be true: if an Aboriginal
nation does not receive the benefts of a surrender, it should not be held to
the burden of the surrender.79 Given the severe consequences of the Bear
Island principle – including the total loss of Aboriginal rights potentially
without any negotiation or legislative expression whatsoever – fairness and
the honour of the Crown require the protection of Aboriginal rights by the
inverse of the principle. We argue below that the Métis did not receive the
benefts of section 31, and thus they should not be held to the burdens
of the section. Tat is, it did not efect an extinguishment by surrender of
Métis title.80
After years of delay, the federal government did eventually distribute section 31 lands as individual grants ranging from 160 to 240 acres, a process
that was reproduced in the scrip commissions that followed. Whereas at frst
glance, scrip and the section 31 grants may appear to complete the exchange
of Métis Indian title for individual land grants, this process departed drastically from the manner in which the Métis originally agreed to extinguish
their Indian title in the Manitoba Act, 1870.81 As part of that agreement, the
Métis leadership expected to be in control of the distribution of the section
31 lands through a committee of its own making that was authorized by the
Canadian executive for this purpose.82 Tis committee was also to exercise
some level of continued jurisdiction over the lands into the future, to protect
them from sale to non-Métis speculators and settlers. Terefore, the implementation of a scrip system at the hands of the federal government was a
substantial unilateral change, which undermined the principal agreements
represented in the Manitoba Act, 1870. If section 31 was never properly
implemented, its extinguishment of the Indian title of the Red River Métis is
also questionable. Furthermore, since the Métis received little beneft from
the distribution of these grants, they hardly refect fair compensation for the
extinguishment of title.
To fully appreciate the depth of the Manitoba Act, 1870, we must go
beyond the text of the document. Although section 31 suggests that the
land was to be chosen and distributed by the lieutenant governor of Manitoba, this language obscures the complex negotiations and oral agreements
that provide the basis for a more robust interpretation of the meaning
behind the section. In the winter of 1870, the Provisional Government of
Assiniboia sent three delegates to Ottawa to negotiate with the Canadian
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government. Teir purpose was to arrive at a satisfactory agreement that
required, among other things, the protection of current Métis landholdings at Red River.83 Over the course of several weeks, the negotiators met
with Macdonald and Cartier, agreeing on what would later become the
Manitoba Act, 1870. Since the act was the result of a protracted and meticulous negotiation process between representatives of the Métis-controlled
provisional government and the Government of Canada in April and May
1870, Canada’s faithfulness to the agreement is vital if Canada now claims
that Métis title was extinguished. If we are to respect the interpretation of
Métis contemporaries, we can view section 31 as an agreement where the
Métis would extinguish their share of Indian title in the new province in
exchange for a federally recognized reserve, as well as other political concessions.84 Te sole surviving account of the negotiations is from Abbé
Noël-Joseph Ritchot, the appointed representative of the Métis at Red
River. In his journal, he recorded that the original agreement was that section 31 lands would be under the control of the new provincial legislature,
“which could pass laws to ensure the continuance of these lands in métis
families.”85 When this was later altered to place the lands under the federal
legislature’s control, Ritchot wanted assurance that they would be protected
as if under provincial control. Te agreed-to compromise was that the lands
would be overseen by a committee created “as soon as might be [possible]
after the Bill should be passed” via an executive order from the Privy Council.86 Trough this oversight committee, the Métis would be in control of
the entire reserve selection and distribution process – from selecting the
reserve lands, to dividing and distributing them, to enacting laws through
the local legislature to prevent outsiders from acquiring them. Even though
Ritchot complained that the Manitoba Bill did not refer to this committee,
both Macdonald and Cartier reassured him that the verbal understandings
of the act would inform its interpretation and implementation.87
Tat the Métis were willing to extinguish their share of Indian title is
clearly articulated in this agreement. What is less clear, however, is whether
the distribution of the 1.4 million acres did extinguish the Métis share of
the title to what is now southern Manitoba. Te verbal agreement was not
implemented. Instead, a scrip system was employed as a means to extinguish the title of individual claimants. In Manitoba, the federal government
did not begin the distribution of these lands until 1876. Since the safety
and social position of the Métis had declined signifcantly in the six years
following the passage of the Manitoba Act, 1870, compounded with administrative delays, Métis families often chose to leave Manitoba. Te scrip
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system ofered them quick cash in exchange for severely discounted land
grants in the 1.4-million-acre Métis reserve.88 So transitory was the beneft
to Métis families that scrip could not have amounted to realistic compensation for the value of Métis title to southern Manitoba.89 Ultimately, Métis
title was not extinguished through a negotiated agreement given ascent by
the Manitoba Act, 1870. It was purportedly extinguished through policy
that difered signifcantly from the agreement that gave rise to section 31.90
From this policy, Métis lands fowed quickly into the hands of speculators and Canadian settlers. Fraudulent dealing also dispossessed Métis families of the land grants that were intended for their children, but four times
between 1881 and 1885 the Manitoba Legislative Assembly passed retroactive statutes to legalize all “irregular” sales of Métis lands and to protect the
often powerful interests who were implicated in the dispossession.91 Due to
these delays and irregularities, the Supreme Court held in Manitoba Metis
Federation that
We conclude that s. 31 of the Manitoba Act constitutes a constitutional
obligation to the Métis people of Manitoba, an Aboriginal people, to provide the Métis children with allotments of land ... [A]s a solemn constitutional obligation to the Métis people of Manitoba aimed at reconciling
their Aboriginal interests with sovereignty, it engaged the honour of the
Crown. Tis required the government to act with diligence in pursuit of
the fulfllment of the promise. On the fndings of the trial judge, the
Crown failed to do so and the obligation to the Métis children remained
largely unfulflled.92

If the original purpose of this agreement were to extinguish the Métis share
of Indian title in southern Manitoba by an agreed-on process, the Crown
ultimately failed to act honourably in its desire to do so. Because the Métis
derived so little beneft from this unilateral shift in policy, which ended their
dream of a substantial land base in Manitoba, it is difcult to argue that the
implementation of section 31 of the Manitoba Act, 1870, resulted in the
meaningful extinguishment of Métis title on the terms originally agreed to
by the Métis at Red River. Te result is that, even among the most vocal
critics of the existence of Métis title, there is general consensus that “it does
not appear that the Métis derived much beneft from s. 31 of the Manitoba
Act.”93 It is therefore our position that Métis Aboriginal title was not surrendered via the Manitoba Act, 1870, and that Métis title persists in what has
become southern Manitoba.
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Scrip Issued Pursuant to the Dominion Lands Act
Te question of whether scrip issued under the Dominion Lands Act extinguished Métis title has been addressed exhaustively elsewhere.94 We will
add only the following arguments: Tis issue should be analyzed as a potential extinguishment by surrender rather than as a potential extinguishment
by legislation. If the issuance of scrip constitutes the former and not the
latter, an analysis of whether the legislation authorizing scrip exhibits the
requisite clear and plain intention is insufcient to answer the extinguishment question. It will be necessary to apply the principles pertaining to
extinguishment by surrender, including the principle – supported by recent
jurisprudence – that only the collective can make a surrender, given that
Aboriginal rights are collective rights. Scrip could not extinguish Aboriginal
rights, including title, because it was issued on an individual basis, not a
collective one.
Just as section 31 and the events surrounding its implementation are
best analyzed as a potential surrender, so too is the scrip issued under the
Dominion Lands Act. As discussed above, with one possible exception, the
government dealt with Métis interests in land by issuing scrip, whereas
it entered into what it saw as land surrender treaties with First Nations.95
Te issuance of scrip should be analyzed as a potential surrender because
from the perspective of the Canadian government, the purpose of scrip was
analogous to that of the land surrender treaties.96 For example, in 1889 with
the adhesion to Treaty 6, scrip commissioners began to accompany treaty
commissioners and issued scrip to Métis individuals at the same time as the
treaty commissioners entered into treaties with First Nations.97 Te court in
Morin and Daigneault concluded that “the impression given to the Indian
and Métis population was that you had to make a choice and it made little
diference whether you were Indian or Métis and whether you took treaty
or scrip.”98 Granted, the choice between scrip and treaty had signifcant consequences in terms of colonial constructions of one’s identity and the identity of one’s descendants.99 Te court’s point here, though, is that Canadian
ofcials intended both scrip and treaties to serve the same purpose – to
extinguish outstanding claims to land. Tus, just as treaties are categorized
as potential surrenders, scrip should be as well.
If the acceptance of scrip is a potential surrender, then assessing extinguishment requires applying the principles pertaining to extinguishment by
surrender and not merely those pertaining to extinguishment by legislation.
A key principle regarding extinguishment by surrender is that it must be
made by the collective.
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In a report written for the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples,
Jofe and Turpel argue persuasively that scrip transactions could not have
extinguished the Aboriginal title of the Métis, as title is a collective right,
but scrip was issued to and accepted by individuals who did not have
the capacity to extinguish collective rights.100 Decisions released after the
publication of Jofe and Turpel’s report confrm the principles underlying their argument. Te Supreme Court of Canada in Behn v Moulton
Contracting Ltd. concluded that Aboriginal rights are collective in nature
and are held by the “Aboriginal group.”101 Tsilhqot'in confrmed that
Aboriginal title is a “collective title,” held not only for the present members of the Aboriginal community in question, but for all succeeding generations as well.102 Te Supreme Court of Canada in Powley confrmed
that to extinguish Aboriginal rights, a surrender must be made by the
collective, and that this principle applies just as much to the Métis as to
First Nations.103 In R v Blais, the Supreme Court of Canada contrasted
the scrip process with the treaty process and noted that the Métis were
dealt with on an individual basis, whereas treaties with First Nations
were concluded on a collective basis.104 Similarly, the court in Morin and
Daigneault confrmed that Métis scrip recipients were dealt with as individuals, not as a collective.105 Tus, if the Métis can establish Aboriginal
title, any extinguishment argument based on the issuance of scrip will not
be compelling.
Extinguishment by Constitutional Amendment
Aside from section 31 of the Manitoba Act, 1870, three other constitutional
amendments or potential constitutional amendments are worth addressing:
the natural resources transfer agreements (NRTAs), the Charlottetown
Accord, and the Canada–Métis Nation Accord.
Te three NRTAs (one for each of the Prairie provinces) have constitutional status by virtue of the Constitution Act, 1930.106 Each contains the
following provision: “the laws respecting game in force in the Province from
time to time shall apply to the Indians within the boundaries thereof.”107
In R v Horseman, the Supreme Court of Canada held that this statement,
combined with Alberta’s legislation regulating trafcking in wildlife, extinguished the Treaty 8 right to hunt for commercial purposes in Alberta.108
Tis conclusion does not afect the hunting or fshing rights of the Métis,
as the court held in Blais that the Métis are not Indians for the purpose of
this provision of the NRTAs.109 Te Supreme Court of Canada’s conclusion

Copyright material, not for distribution

This PDF for the use in the The Osgoode Digital Commons only

Te Resilience of Métis Title

85

in Daniels that the Métis are Indians for the purpose of section 91(24) of the
Constitution Act, 1867, does not alter the principle from Blais.110 Tus, the
NRTAs do not efect an extinguishment of Métis rights.111
Despite Canada’s assumption that Métis title was previously extinguished, its actions could suggest that it doubts the efficacy of that extinguishment. In 1992, the Métis Nation and the Government of Canada
agreed to the Métis Nation Accord as a component of the Charlottetown Accord constitutional amendment package. Both parties agreed
to pursue comprehensive land claims and self-government negotiations,
which meant that the relevant provinces (with the exception of Alberta)
would “make available their fair share of Crown lands for transfer to
Métis self-governing institutions.”112 These lands and their subsequent
governance would be organized as a “land negotiation process” between
Canada, the provinces, and representatives of the Métis Nation.113
In Canada, these kinds of comprehensive land claims processes have
almost exclusively concerned lands and Indigenous peoples where title is
unextinguished or extinguishment was questionable. Presumably, such
negotiations would not have been necessary if the Crown were confident that it had legitimately extinguished Métis title across the West.
More recently, on 13 April 2017, the Métis National Council and the
five provincial Métis organizations signed an agreement in principle
with the federal government to “advance reconciliation of the rights,
claims, interests and aspirations of the Métis Nation and those of all
Canadians.”114 Although the agreement does not mention land claims in
particular, it is nonetheless cognizant that “outstanding claims against
the Crown” may still exist, and it establishes a new “Permanent Bilateral
Mechanism” to address them.115 Again, this accord would probably be
unnecessary if the government had extinguished Métis title to the satisfaction of its own institutions and citizens.
Ottawa’s conduct with the Métis Nation Accord shows that there are
cracks in its confdence regarding Métis extinguishment. Although there
remains resistance among Canadian governments to acknowledging that
Métis title persists, there is also a growing realization that Métis lands
and rights are live issues that must be dealt with in more substantive ways.
Métis title and its unsuccessful extinguishment require a level of attention
and dialogue previously missing, and if the Métis Nation Accord and more
recent negotiations are any indication, the future lies not in denying Métis
title, but in negotiating the terms for its recognition.
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Conclusion
With the failure of Canada to extinguish Métis title through surrender,
legislation, or constitutional amendment, it is therefore logical and just to
assume that Métis title to the Métis homelands persists. Whereas Manitoba
Métis in 1870 may have been willing to surrender their share of title to their
homelands, they were willing to do so only under certain circumstances and
with a guarantee that these rights would be fairly compensated with a large
land reserve. It is unjust to assume that if the Crown did not fulfll its end of
the bargain, the Métis should be held to theirs. If Métis title were not successfully extinguished through any of these means, the Crown possesses
substantial and ongoing obligations to the Métis people. Both the honour of
the Crown and the principle of reconciliation require that these obligations
be addressed. Indeed, this would have profound implications for the current
state of Métis-Canada relations. It would necessitate a substantial redress
and recognition of Métis lands (alongside the lands of other Indigenous
peoples) and it would entail good faith negotiations between the two parties
to rectify the current situation. Te recognition that Métis title is unextinguished, far from ushering in an era of uncertainty and contention, could
also be the opportunity to rectify historical and contemporary injustices,
providing the moral imperative to build better relations with one another.
Tis outcome, however, is dependent on good faith actions from Canadian
political and juridical leaders, grounded in a deep analysis of historical
events, which contradict the colonial imagination that has for so long shaped
Métis-Canada relations.
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possible means of extinguishment, which is exhibited in Chippewas of Sarnia Band
v Canada (Attorney General), 101 OTC 1, 40 RPR (3d) 49 (ONSC), af ’d 51 OR (3d)
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governments to extinguish Aboriginal rights, given the contending sovereignties
within Canada, which includes the sovereignty of Aboriginal peoples. And they
point out that the Crown owes a fduciary duty to Aboriginal peoples, which constrains its capacity to extinguish their rights. Paul Jofe and Mary Ellen Turpel, Extinguishment of the Rights of Aboriginal Peoples: Problems and Alternatives, a Study
Prepared for the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (Ottawa: Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, 1995), i–ii, http://publications.gc.ca/site/eng/9.829901/
publication.html.
Te section reads, “Te existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples
of Canada are hereby recognized and afrmed.” Constitution Act, 1982, s 35(1), being
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18 Delgamuukw, supra note 10 at paras 173–74.
19 Constitution Act, 1867, (UK), 30 and 31 Vict, c 3, s 91(24).
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authority to extinguish Aboriginal rights would have continued after Confederation;
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27 See H.W. Roger Townshend, “What Diference Did Daniels Make?” (paper prepared
for the Ontario Bar Association’s ffteenth annual Charter conference, Toronto, 6
October 2016), archived with Karen Drake.
28 Manitoba Act, 1870, 33 Vict, c 3 (Canada) [Manitoba Act]; Dominion Lands Act,
1872, 35 Vict, c 23 [Dominion Lands Act]. See Jofe and Turpel, supra note 6 at
93–94, who argue that “until 1977, it would appear that the only Canadian legislative
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Alexander Innes, “Multicultural Bands on the Northern Plains and the Notion of
‘Tribal Histories’” in Robin Jarvis Brownlie and Valerie J. Korinek, eds., Finding a
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